Business Description
YETI Holdings, Inc. develops, promotes, sells, and distributes premium products designed for outdoor enthusiasts and recreational activities, all under the prominent YETI brand. Their offerings encompass a diverse selection of hard and soft coolers, various cargo solutions, bags, and outdoor lifestyle items, along with complementary accessories. The company also provides an extensive array of drinkware under its Rambler brand, including tumblers, bottles, mugs, and jugs, complete with associated accessories like straw caps and handles. Additionally, YETI markets branded gear such as hats, shirts, and ice substitutes. The firm distributes its merchandise through a wide network of independent retailers, including specialized outdoor stores, hardware shops, sporting goods outlets, and farm and ranch supply centers, as well as directly through its corporate website. YETI Holdings, Inc. boasts an international footprint, serving markets in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Europe, Hong Kong, China, Singapore, and Japan. The company was founded in Austin, Texas, in 2006.
Business History
Generated: Jun 13, 2026 3:02amPrice Overview
Last updated: Jun 13, 2026 3:00am (14d ago)Price History (1 Year)
Revenue & Net Income Trend
| Period | Revenue | Net Income | Net Margin | YoY/QoQ |
|---|
Key Metrics
EPS (Diluted): 2.05
Total Equity: $650.28M
Shares: 81,595,000
Total Debt: $88.28M
Cash: $188.34M
EBITDA: $274.96M
Total Debt: $88.28M
Cash: $188.34M
Revenue: $1.87B
Revenue: $1.87B
Revenue: $1.87B
Total Equity: $650.28M
Tax Rate: 24.9%
Equity: $650.28M
Total Debt: $88.28M
Cash: $188.34M
Current Liabilities: $334.34M
Long-Term Debt: $68.06M
Total Debt: $88.28M
Total Equity: $650.28M
Shares: 81,595,000
Shares: 81,595,000
CapEx: -$42.67M
Shares: 81,595,000
Stock Price: $50.42
Net Income: $165.39M
Industry Benchmarks
Advanced Analysis Forensic deep-dive · three lenses
YETI looks like a high-quality mature consumer brand. The balance sheet is in great shape — $188M liquid cash, $100M net cash, Altman Z of 6.65, and self-funding from $212M of annual FCF. Earnings quality screens cleanly: OCF/NI 1.31x, accruals -3.5% of assets, Beneish M -2.51. Importantly, management is a net buyer of its own stock — diluted shares fell from 88.7M (2021) to 81.6M (2026), a -2.1% CAGR, with buybacks running ~395% of SBC. For a consumer company at this scale, that is disciplined per-share stewardship.
The concern is the operating trajectory. Revenue growth has decelerated sharply (1.41B→1.60B→1.66B→1.83B→1.87B; only ~2% in the most recent year) and operating margin has stepped down from 19.5% in 2021 to 11.4% in the latest year, with net income ($165M) still below the 2021 peak ($213M). Gross margin recovered from the 2022 inventory blow-up (47.9%) back to ~57-58%, but operating leverage has not returned — opex is absorbing the gross-margin recovery. FCF is the bright spot, holding at ~$212-220M for three straight years, well above net income.
Insider tape is neutral-to-soft: no open-market P buys, two small S sales over 12 months ($442K), and the recent activity is routine award/tax-withhold/gift codes. Nothing alarming, nothing confirming. Overall this reads as a solid, well-run, cash-generative brand whose growth story has matured faster than its margin structure has reset.
Verify before trusting this (6)
- Category/SKU mix behind the opex creep — is the margin step-down from international/D2C build-out (investment) or structural (competition from Stanley/Owala)?
- Customer/channel concentration — wholesale (Dick's, Amazon) vs. D2C split in the 10-K
- Inventory turns and inventory-to-sales trend to confirm the 2022 issue is fully behind them
- Any product recall or warranty reserves disclosed (drinkware recall history exists)
- Capital allocation framework — is the buyback opportunistic or programmatic, and how much authorization remains
- International revenue growth rate vs. domestic — durability of the brand outside the US
The e2e composite fair value is $22.10 and the signal-adjusted FV is $17.72, with a DCF of $24.53 and an EPV floor of $17.23 — a tight cluster well below the $50.42 print. Even granting a brand premium for YETI's quality grade (Strong, clean books, real FCF, genuine buybacks), the gap is too wide to dismiss as model error: every method independently lands in the high-teens to mid-$20s. I'd skeptically deserve-value this name around $30-35, which still leaves the stock ~40-65% above any defensible anchor.
What's priced in at $50: a re-acceleration of revenue growth, stable mid-teens operating margins, and durable international expansion offsetting a mature US cooler/drinkware base. The bear case — that op margin has nearly halved from peak while the category matures and private label encroaches — is NOT in the price. Earnings quality is high so there's no haircut to apply, but that just means the FCF is real, not that the multiple is right. There is essentially no margin of safety here; you are paying for brand and balance sheet, with the growth optionality as a free call you may or may not collect.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- FY guidance for revenue growth and operating margin — is mid-teens op margin the new normal or a trough?
- International segment growth rate and contribution margin — the only credible re-acceleration lever
- Drinkware vs cooler mix and any category extension traction (cargo, apparel)
- Buyback pace and remaining authorization — supports per-share compounding
- Inventory and gross margin trajectory — any signs of promotional pressure
YETI's sentiment picture is a tug-of-war. The active narrative is still a strong cult-favorite story with high devotion and lifestyle-brand intensity, which is what has kept the stock anchored well above any defensible DCF anchor. That narrative is the single biggest non-fundamental support beneath the price. But durability is only moderate, the story is mature, and there is no fresh catalyst flow lighting it back up - it is more 'holding' than 'expanding.' Against that, the tape is neutral but not friendly: VIX in the upper half of its range, S&P off its highs, and YETI carries a 1.74 beta in discretionary leisure - exactly the cohort that gets sold first if risk-off accelerates. Higher 10y at 4.48% pressures premium-multiple consumer names. Analyst tone is the tell: consensus is Buy in name only (11 Buy / 11 Hold, zero Strong anything), the price has already closed in on the $50.22 target, and a recent revision was cut to $45. That is analysts quietly de-rating into a still-intact narrative - classic divergence and a mild headwind. Net: the cult story cushions the downside pressure from the tape and stale sell-side enthusiasm, but there is no clear tailwind pulling it higher from here.
Verify before trusting this (5)
- Holiday and gifting-season demand commentary - the cult narrative lives or dies on that data point
- Further analyst target cuts or downgrades that would confirm the quiet de-rating
- VIX break above 20 or sharper risk-off rotation that would punish high-beta discretionary names disproportionately
- Any private-label or premium-cooler competitive headline that cracks the brand-moat story
- Affluent-consumer spending prints (luxury, leisure) as a read-through to YETI's customer
Deep Analysis
Pre-flight intelligence scans the company first, then routes to the right analytical methods.
Income Statement (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 13, 2026 3:05am (14d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | $1.4B | $1.6B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.9B |
| Cost of Revenue | $594.9M | $831.8M | $715.5M | $766.6M | $795.8M |
| Gross Profit | $816.1M | $763.4M | $943.2M | $1.1B | $1.1B |
| Operating Expenses | $541.2M | $637.0M | $717.7M | $817.9M | $859.1M |
| Operating Income | $274.9M | $126.4M | $225.5M | $245.4M | $213.6M |
| Net Income | $212.6M | $89.7M | $169.9M | $175.7M | $165.4M |
| EBITDA | $303.8M | $160.5M | $273.3M | $281.5M | $275.0M |
| EPS | $2.43 | $1.04 | $1.96 | $2.07 | $2.05 |
| EPS (Diluted) | — | — | — | — | — |
Balance Sheet (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 13, 2026 3:02am (14d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash & Equivalents | $312.2M | $234.7M | $439.0M | $358.8M | $188.3M |
| Total Current Assets | $770.2M | $718.9M | $914.4M | $826.8M | $660.3M |
| Total Assets | $1.1B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
| Current Liabilities | $403.7M | $409.0M | $398.4M | $379.5M | $334.3M |
| Long-Term Debt | $88.4M | $66.5M | $75.2M | $71.6M | $68.1M |
| Total Liabilities | $578.5M | $550.3M | $573.6M | $546.0M | $649.8M |
| Total Equity | $517.8M | $526.5M | $723.6M | $740.1M | $650.3M |
| Retained Earnings | $178.9M | $268.6M | $438.4M | $614.1M | $779.5M |
Cash Flow (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 13, 2026 3:05am (14d ago)| Metric | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating Cash Flow | $146.5M | $100.9M | $285.9M | $261.4M | $254.7M |
| Capital Expenditure | -$65.8M | -$56.9M | -$72.8M | -$41.8M | -$42.7M |
| Free Cash Flow | $80.8M | $44.0M | $213.1M | $219.6M | $212.1M |
| Acquisitions (net) | $0 | $0 | $0 | -$36.2M | $0 |
| Debt Repayment | — | — | — | — | — |
| Dividends Paid | — | — | — | — | — |
| Stock Buybacks | $0 | -$100.0M | $0 | -$200.0M | -$297.8M |
| Net Change in Cash | $58.9M | -$77.4M | $204.2M | -$80.2M | -$170.5M |
Analyst Estimates (Annual)
Last updated: Jun 13, 2026 3:00am (14d ago)| Metric | 2028 | 2029 | 2030 | 2031 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue |
$2.2B $2.1B – $2.2B
|
$2.3B $2.3B – $2.3B
|
$2.3B $2.3B – $2.4B
|
$2.4B $2.4B – $2.5B
|
| EBITDA |
$338.4M $335.3M – $344.7M
|
$358.3M $358.3M – $358.3M
|
$363.3M $359.0M – $370.3M
|
$381.5M $376.9M – $388.9M
|
| Net Income |
$273.2M $255.1M – $291.3M
|
$297.7M $258.6M – $336.9M
|
$291.0M $286.5M – $298.3M
|
$314.9M $310.0M – $322.8M
|
| EPS | — | — | — | — |
Growth Trends (YoY %)
Last updated: Jun 13, 2026 3:05am (14d ago)| Metric | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue Growth | +13.1% | +4.0% | +10.3% | +2.1% |
| Gross Profit Growth | -6.5% | +23.6% | +12.7% | +0.9% |
| Operating Income Growth | -54.0% | +78.4% | +8.8% | -13.0% |
| Net Income Growth | -57.8% | +89.4% | +3.4% | -5.9% |
| EBITDA Growth | -47.2% | +70.3% | +3.0% | -2.3% |
Insider Trading (Recent)
Last updated: Jun 13, 2026 3:05am (14d ago)All SEC Form 4 codes
- P Purchase
- Open-market or private purchase of shares.
- S Sale
- Open-market or private sale of shares.
- A Award / grant
- Grant or award of securities (RSUs, options, etc.) under Rule 16b-3.
- D Return to issuer
- Securities disposed back to the company under Rule 16b-3.
- F In-kind (tax)
- Shares withheld or delivered to pay the option-exercise price or tax — not an open-market sale.
- I Discretionary
- Discretionary transaction under an employee plan — Rule 16b-3(f).
- M Option exercise
- Exercise or conversion of a derivative (option/RSU) into shares — exempt.
- C Conversion
- Conversion of a derivative security into the underlying shares.
- E Short expiration
- Expiration of a short derivative position.
- H Long expiration
- Expiration or cancellation of a long derivative position with value received.
- O OTM exercise
- Exercise of an out-of-the-money derivative.
- X ITM exercise
- Exercise of an in-the-money or at-the-money derivative.
- G Gift
- Bona fide gift of securities.
- L Small acquisition
- Small acquisition under Rule 16a-6.
- W Inheritance
- Acquisition or disposition by will or the laws of descent.
- Z Voting trust
- Deposit into or withdrawal from a voting trust.
- J Other
- Other acquisition or disposition (explained in a Form 4 footnote).
- K Equity swap
- Transaction in an equity swap or similar instrument.
- U Tender / buyout
- Disposition via tender of shares in a change-of-control transaction.
Compensation-plan codes (A, D, F, M) are routine and rarely directional. Open-market P (buy) and S (sale) carry the most signal.
| Date | Insider | Type | Shares | Price | Value |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026-05-07 | Axelrod Elizabeth L | A-Award | 3,719.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Arens Arne | A-Award | 3,719.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | SHEARER ROBERT K | A-Award | 9,117.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Welander Jan Magnus | A-Award | 6,238.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Kelley Mary Lou | A-Award | 3,719.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Kelley Mary Lou | A-Award | 2,819.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | MCCOY DUSTAN E | A-Award | 3,719.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | Dean Alison | A-Award | 3,719.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-07 | GIBEAU FRANK D | A-Award | 3,719.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | GIBEAU FRANK D | G-Gift | 5,467.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-05-06 | GIBEAU FRANK D | G-Gift | 5,467.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-24 | Barksdale Bryan C. | F-InKind | 546.00 | $45.44 | $24,810 |
| 2026-02-24 | Barksdale Bryan C. | F-InKind | 546.00 | $45.44 | $24,810 |
| 2026-02-24 | Reintjes Matthew J | F-InKind | 1,754.00 | $45.44 | $79,702 |
| 2026-02-24 | Reintjes Matthew J | F-InKind | 10,523.00 | $45.44 | $478,165 |
| 2026-02-24 | Duff Martin | F-InKind | 607.00 | $45.44 | $27,582 |
| 2026-02-23 | Bomar Scott C | A-Award | 55,298.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-23 | Bomar Scott C | A-Award | 20,045.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
| 2026-02-23 | Bomar Scott C | 0.00 | $0.00 | $0 | |
| 2026-02-20 | Reintjes Matthew J | A-Award | 160,448.00 | $0.00 | $0 |
Narrative Economics
market-narrative step).
Delvantic AI Findings
The raw trajectory tells a less catastrophic story than the synthesis verdict implies. Revenue grew from $1.41B (2021) to $1.87B (TTM 2026) — a 5.8% CAGR with no down year, and gross margin actually expanded from 57.8% in 2021 to ~57.4% with a recovery from the 47.6% trough in 2022 (resin/freight shock). Operating margin compressed from 19.5% in 2021 to ~11.4% TTM, which is the real bear case — but NI is essentially flat at $165–176M across the last three years, not falling off a cliff. The most recent quarter (Apr 2026: $380M rev, 2.6% NM) looks ugly but it's the seasonally weakest quarter and Q4'25 ($583.7M, 10% NM) was solid. FCF of $212M on a $3.82B market cap is a 5.5% FCF yield — that is not "deteriorating value trap" pricing.
Where I disagree sharply with the synthesis: a $17.72 DCF fair value implies YETI is worth ~6x FCF, which is distressed-retailer pricing for a company with 57% gross margins, no net debt (cash $188M, current ratio 1.98), 16.6% ROIC, and a brand that — whatever you think of its growth runway — still sells $1.87B of product at premium prices. The "Market Forces" claim of -1% earnings decline is technically true on CAGR but the base year (2021) was a COVID-stimulus peak; measuring from 2022's $89.7M NI gets you a +23% earnings CAGR. Pick your start date, pick your story. The synthesis is anchored on a bear framing the data doesn't actually force.
That said, the bears aren't wrong about direction. Operating margin going from 19.5% → 11.4% is real brand-equity erosion or input-cost stickiness, and recent revenue YoY of 2.1% with earnings YoY -5.9% says the business is grinding, not compounding. The 9,117/6,238/3,719-share awards on 2026-05-07 are routine annual equity grants, not a conviction signal; the G-gift on 5/6 is also a non-event. No open-market insider buys is mildly negative for a stock the bulls say is mispriced. The cult-favorite narrative framing is fair but durability is the right word — Stanley tumblers ate YETI's drinkware mindshare in 2023-24, and there's no evidence YETI has a Patagonia-style category extension working yet. International is unproven at scale.
My read: fair value is roughly 13–15x $165M NI = $2.1–2.5B, or 11–12x FCF = $2.3–2.5B, implying $27–33/share — meaningfully below $50 but nowhere near $17.72. The market is paying ~23x TTM earnings and ~18x FCF for a brand with decelerating top line and compressed margins; that's a premium I wouldn't pay, but the synthesis's 65% downside call requires you to believe operating margins keep compressing toward 7-8% and revenue stalls outright. Neither is in the actual print. I dissent from the synthesis on magnitude but agree on direction. The contrarian long case — that margin recovery to 14-15% plus successful category extension (bags, outdoor gear) re-rates this to $65 — exists but requires evidence not yet in the numbers. Wait for a Q2/Q3 print showing op margin stabilization above 12% or a credible new category doing >$100M run-rate before touching it.
GPT Critique
In examining YETI Holdings, Inc., the most striking aspect is the company's consistent revenue growth, achieving a 5.8% CAGR from 2021 to 2026, culminating in $1.87 billion in revenue. This suggests a robust sales environment despite the pressures of a saturated market. However, the significant compression in operating margins from 19.5% in 2021 to approximately 11.4% TTM is concerning. This margin erosion, coupled with only a modest revenue increase of 2.1% YoY and a decline in earnings by 5.9% YoY, indicates that while YETI's top line remains healthy, its profitability is under strain. The company's strong gross margins, consistently around 57-58%, underscore its brand strength and pricing power, yet they are not translating into net income growth, likely due to rising operational costs or competitive pressures.
Opus asserts that YETI is overvalued but not a value trap, suggesting a fair value range of $28-33 per share, as opposed to the synthesized verdict of $17.72. I align with Opus here, finding the $17.72 valuation excessively pessimistic. YETI's brand strength, evidenced by its premium pricing and gross margins, supports a higher valuation than the synthesis proposes. The disparity in net income figures when considering different base years, as Opus notes, highlights the volatility and challenges in YETI's earnings trajectory. However, I diverge from Opus in viewing the company's current valuation as potentially more justified given its branding and cash flow metrics. The FCF yield of 5.5% and a strong cash position with no net debt indicate financial resilience, which should command a premium over the distressed retailer pricing implied by a $17.72 target.
While agreeing with Opus that the "bear case" of deteriorating fundamentals is overstated, I also acknowledge the valid concerns about YETI's operational challenges. The lack of open-market insider buys and the routine nature of recent insider equity grants do not inspire confidence in immediate upside potential. However, this insider activity is not necessarily indicative of broader strategic missteps. The brand's reliance on its cult status and the challenges of international expansion, as Opus points out, are critical risks. The company's ability to extend its brand successfully into new categories remains unproven, and without evidence of operational margin recovery or successful diversification, the market's current expectations appear optimistic.
A careful skeptic might argue that both views underestimate the potential for further margin compression and overestimate the brand's resilience in a downturn. The macroeconomic environment, with potential consumer spending pullbacks, could expose YETI's vulnerabilities more starkly than anticipated. Additionally, the narrative premium attached to YETI's brand might not sustain if consumer preferences shift rapidly, particularly in an economic slowdown.